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Massimo Mori 
 
KANT AND HISTORICAL KNOWLEDGE  
 
It is common knowledge that the philosophy of history is not a marginal 
episode in Kantian thinking. Yet the eagerness not to relapse into this 
historiographical prejudice has often caused interpreters to commit the 
opposite error of searching at all costs for its absolute internal coherence and 
its complete adherence to the transcendental “system”, understood in turn as 
a compact doctrinal corpus. Kant’s philosophy of history, perhaps more than 
other parts of his thought, presents conceptual difficulties, arising from 
questions of internal consistence as well as from the demand to incorporate 
into the transcendental system requirements originating from different cultural 
traditions. One of these shady areas is the epistemological status of historical 
knowledge, understood not as the historiographical reconstruction of specific 
occurrences (“history proper, that of empirical composition”), but rather as the 
overall understanding of the meaning and orientation of the historical process 
(from the point of view of a “philosophical mind”)1. This is a problem of great 
relevance as it concerns fundamental questions of Kantian reflection on 
history, such as the relationship between finality and causality, or between 
freedom and necessity. In regards to this problem I reckon that Kant draws on 
three forms of knowledge (for reasons which will be expounded upon): 
regulative, constitutive and normative in ethical sense. The term “knowledge” 
here must be taken in the broadest sense and not strictly Kantian, as a 
generic form of knowledge which includes determinant judgment (in which 
constitutive “knowing”, strictly speaking, is quite different from mere 
“thinking”), reflective judgment (which still expresses a theoretical dimension 
of knowledge, though devoid of constitutive value), and moral judgment 
(which is founded upon a synthetic process a priori of the pure reason in its 
                                                 
1 Cf. Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte der Menschheit, VIII, 30, 30-32 (Kant, 
Political Writings, ed. by H. Reiss, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1770, p. 
53). Kant’s works are always cited with reference to the Academie-Ausgabe: 
Gesammelte Schriften, Berlin-Leipzig, de Gruyter. 1910-. As per usual, the Roman 
numeral indicates the volume, and the Arabian numerals the page(s) and the line(s). 
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practical employment). In regards to the general framework of the philosophy 
of history and of its placement in the overall context of Kantian thought, these 
three forms of knowledge—which are, let it not be forgotten, different 
expressions of the very same reason—appear mainly complementary, and in 
some way each of them takes part in the realization of the others. This does 
not mean, however, that all clashes, dissonances or juxtapositions among the 
various levels are overcome. In the interpretation which I am proposing a 
complete convergence can only be found in one point.   
1. Constitutive knowledge and regulative knowledge – It is a universally 
shared view that Kant’s philosophy of history must be read in the light of the 
Critique of Judgment2. This is primarily because, as is known, Kant himself 
offers a brief but effective synthesis of it in § 83 of the third Critique, providing 
precise coordinates for its position in the framework of the already completed 
transcendental system. But above all—and as a consequence—the point of 
view of the Critique of Judgment proves indispensable because without a 
reference to the theory of reflective judgment it is impossible to understand 
the relation that, in the historical process, is entertained by conceptual pairs 
such as causal mechanism and final destination, natural necessity and moral 
freedom, the phenomenal world of historical occurrences and the noumenal 
reality to which it refers. An example, which is not worth dwelling on due to its 
notoriety, is that any understanding of Kantian philosophy of history is 
precluded without reference to §§ 80-81, relative to the relationship between 
the principle of mechanism and the principle of finality: the former is  
subordinated to the later as soon as one shifts from the constitutive to 
regulative knowledge. Yet it is clear that a form of regulative knowledge has 
already been present since Kant’s first writing on history, Idee zu einer 
allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht (Idea for a Universal 
History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose). Being from 1784, this work is still well 
                                                 
2 In reality, this position has existed from the very first interpretations of Kantian 
philosophy of history: cf. F. Medicus, Kants Philosophie der Geschichte, “Kant-
Studien”, VII, 1902, pp. 1-22, 171-299; though it became an inevitable starting point 
for each study regarding the topic, beginning with the works of G. Lehmann, System 
und Geschichte in Kants Philosophie, “Il pensiero”, III, 1958, 14-34; F. Kaulbach, Der 
Zusammenhang zwischen Naturphilosophie und Geschichtsphilosophie bei Kant, 
“Kant-Studien”, LVI, 1966, pp. 430-51 and especially after K. Düsing’s classic study, 
Die Teleologie in Kants Weltbegriff, Bonn, Bouvier, 1968,  pp. 217-28.  
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away from the definition of the reflective function of judgment, which Kant will 
reach, especially with regards to his teleological application, in the late 
seventeen-eighties3. The term Idee, which appears in the very title of the 
work, is not to be understood in a traditional sense, but rather in the 
transcendental sense of a concept of an unconditional totality, which falls out 
of experience; in this case, the totality of history. This does not indicate a 
knowable object, but rather, in a purely normative form, “an idea of how world 
events must develop if they are to conform to certain rational ends”4. In the 
work, the expression “Leitfaden” (“guide”, “rule”) frequently appears (and once 
the expression “a priori Leitfaden”5), to suggest that the function of the 
philosophy of history is to apply single occurrences to an overall order, in such 
a way that what is empirically a mere “aggregate” of facts can be represented 
as a rational “system.” The “purpose in nature” (Naturabsicht) or the “hidden 
plan of nature” (VIII, 27, 3), to which Kant often refers, has nothing to do with 
the “cunning” of Hegelian reason6; nor is it the result of a necessary causal 
process that can be scientifically reconstructed, as various interpreters from 
the early twentieth century liked to claim7.            
     Amid Idea and the most mature expression of Kantian philosophy of 
history, the second part of Der Streit der Fakultäten (The Conflict of the 
                                                 
3 Cf. J. H. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant’s Critique of Judgement, Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 7-8.  
4 VIII, 29, 7-8; Political Writings, p. 51.  P. Chiodi was among the first to focus on the 
transcendental meaning of the term “idea” in the work from ’84 in his La filosofia 
kantiana della storia, “Rivista di filosofia”, LVIII, 1967, pp. 263-287, specifically p. 
278. 
5 VIII, 30, 29; Political Writings, p. 53: “A priori rule”. 
6 VIII, 18,8 and 27, 3; Political Writings, pp. 42 and 53.  The comparison with Hegel 
was proposed, amongst others, by L. Landgrebe, Die Geschichte im Denken Kants, 
”Studium generale”, VII, 1954, p. 536; K. Weyand, Kants Geschichtsphilosophie: Ihre 
Entwicklung und ihr Verhältnis zur Aufklärung, Köln, Kölner Universitätsverlag, 1963, 
pp. 43-44; M. Despland, Kant on History and Religion, Montreal, McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 1973, pp. 55 e 70; F. Kaulbach, Welchen Nutzen gibt Kant der 
Geschichtsphilosophie?, “Kant-Studien”, LXVI, 1975, p. 67. 
7These interpretations are strongly conditioned by theoretical premises; of positivist 
nature in the case of K. Lamprecht, Herder und Kant als Theoretiker der 
Geschichtswissenschaft, “Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik”, LXIX, 
1897, pp. 161-203, or ascribable to “neo-Kantian socialism” in the case of K. 
Vorländer, Introduction to I. Kant, Kleinere Schriften zur Geschichtsphilosophie, Ethik 
und Politik, Leipzig, Meiner, 1913, or of M. Adler, Kant und der Sozialismus (1904), in 
Kant und der Marxismus. Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Erkenntniskritik und Theorie des 
Sozialen, Berlin, Laub, 1925, pp. 83-132. 
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Faculties) from 1798, we find continuity in the name of regulative knowledge. 
This does not mean, however, that nothing had changed in almost fifteen 
years. While the Critique of Judgment will inspire the historical-philosophical 
writings of the seventeen-nineties, the model of regulative knowledge in the 
work from ‘84 is still offered by the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of 
Pure Reason, whose first edition precedes Idea by three years. The idea can 
assume a practical function, as shown by the reference to Plato found in 
Section I of Chapter I of the Dialectic. The speculative ideas themselves, 
moreover, “may perhaps make possible a transition from the concepts of 
nature to the practical concepts, and in that way may give support to the 
moral ideas themselves, bringing them into connection with the speculative 
knowledge of reason”8. Similarly, the telos that Idea assigns to the historical 
process allows us to speak of a “chiliasm” in history, which, though it does not 
guarantee theoretical certainties, promotes man’s “approximation” towards the 
practical objective in an asymptotic way9. However, in the Transcendental 
Dialectic of the first Critique the regulative function of the idea is considered in 
its theoretical quality of guiding concept of constitutive knowledge, more so 
than in its practical quality. The problem is bringing the multiple forms of 
knowledge back to the unity of the system. The single piece of knowledge, in 
fact, despite being determined by the a priori principles of intellect, is not per 
se combined to other ones through systematic connections.  
 
This unity of reason always presupposes an idea, namely, that of the form of a whole 
of knowledge -- a whole which is prior to the determinate knowledge of the parts and 
which contains the conditions that determine a priori for every part its position and 
relation to the other parts10. 
     
There is no reason, then, to exclude the notion that this theoretical and 
systematical function, too, together with the practical function, is relevant in 
Idea. It is no accident that in this work Kant undeniably attributes a primary 
role to constitutive knowledge (founded on the causal synthesis of 
experience) not only in the reconstruction of empirical history, which he 
                                                 
8 A 329 = B 386 (Critique of Pure Reason, translated by N. Kemp Smith, London-
New York, Macmillan-St. Martin Press, 1929, p. 320). 
9 VIII, 23, 24; Political Writings, p. 47. Cf. also VIII, 27, 1-13 
10 A 645 = B 673 (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 534). 
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mentions briefly in closing, but also in the philosophy of history. This type of 
knowledge cannot be excluded from the historical world, since human actions, 
which constitute its object, “are determined in accordance with natural laws, 
as is every other natural event”11. The problem, then, is not found in 
contrasting constitutive knowledge of nature against regulative knowledge of 
history, but rather in realizing a synergy between constitutive and regulative 
knowledge, just as it occurs in the natural sciences. As a result, the idea of an 
overall meaning permits historical-causal knowledge to proceed. The 
proposition of a regulative guiding thread does not seem so incompatible with 
the hope that one day a Kepler or a Newton will come to life for history, too; 
based on such a regulative principle, they will give it an entirely causal 
explanation according to “definite laws”, just as the real Kepler and Newton 
(or even Kant himself in the Universal Natural History and Theory of Heaven 
from 1755) did with astronomy12. The emerging statistical science, which is 
mentioned in Kant’s writings on race and in his Anthropology from a 
Pragmatic Point of View, proposed the possibility of detecting methodical 
analogies between historical knowledge and the natural sciences. Certain 
uniformities or regularities of social phenomena (trends in marriage or in 
death considered in the long term)13 appeared to be especially relevant to 
empirical laws. In both science and history one could think of increasingly 
broad generalizations and increasingly vast taxonomic hierarchies that, 
despite remaining within possible and conditioned experience, could prefigure 
laws capable of totally explaining a whole class of phenomena (as is the case 
with Newton’s law of gravity, for example). 
In Idea, however, the relationship between causality and finality (and, 
therefore, between constitutive and normative knowledge) is not entirely clear. 
In certain passages the need to acknowledge a cognitive dimension of the 
philosophy of history makes the teleological perspective assume an almost 
determinant character, which draws it near natural causality. For instance, in 
Propositions I and II, the “teleological theory of nature” is traced back to the 
development of pre-existing “germs” (Keime) in man. This concept oscillates 
                                                 
11 VIII, 17, 3-4; Political Writings, p. 41. 
12 Cf. VIII, 18, 9-17; Political Writings, p. 42. 
13 Cf, VIII, 17, 12-21; Political Writings, p. 41. 
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ambiguously between final and efficient causality, which also occurs in 
epigenetic theories deriving from Blumenbach, from which Kant drew 
inspiration. Similarly, the finality of the succession of generations—which was, 
pour cause, much to the dismay of Herder14—appears to make reference to 
the Enlightenment doctrine of progress as mechanical (causal) accumulation 
of knowledge and civilization, more so than to a transcendental concept of 
ends.    
The relative obscurity of the relationship between causality and finalism 
in Idea, however, is due to a more structural reason, which reflects a difficulty 
that is already present in the Critique of Pure Reason and exceeded only in 
the third Critique. Both Critiques face the problem of the systematic unity of 
the knowledge of nature, understood as the organic relation of the multiple 
natural phenomena to the one system of science, as well as the unity of the 
empirical and particular laws of science and the a priori and universal laws of 
nature. In both cases, therefore, the possibility of a teleological interpretation 
of nature is involved: through the doctrine of ideas in the Transcendental 
Dialectic in the first Critique, and through the doctrine of teleological judgment 
in the third. Yet, methodologically, natural finality is understood in two very 
different senses15. In the Dialectic of Pure Reason (but also in the so-called 
                                                 
14 Cf. the familiar mention, which is implicitly polemic toward Kant, in the second part 
of Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, l. VIII, ch. V: “what could it 
mean to say […] that all generations are made for the last generation, which sits 
enthroned on the decayed frame of the happiness of all previous ones?” (J.G. 
Herder, Werke in zehn Bänden, vol. VI, edited by M. Bollacher, Frankfurt am Main, 
Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 1989, p. 332). Cf. also the acrimonious tone in the letter 
to Hamann from February 14, 1785 in which Herder, referring to Kant, ironically 
states that he has no use for “his childish plan according to which the human being is 
created for the species and the most perfect state-machine at the end of time”(J.G. 
Hamann, Briefwechsel, edited by W. Ziesemer and A. Henkel, 7 vol., Wiesbaden, 
Insel Verlag, 1955-79, V, p. 363). 
15 For more on this, cf. J. D. Mc Farland, Kant’s Concept of Teleology, Edinburgh, 
University of Edinburgh Press, 1980, pp. 18-24 e 32-42. On the consequences that 
the various systematic conceptions from the first and third Critiques have on Kantian 
philosophy of history cf. P. Kleingeld, Fortschritt und Vernunft: Zur 
Geschichtsphilosophie Kants, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 1995, ch. VII. 
Kleingeld also has the merit of having insisted upon the theoretical value of Kantian 
philosophy of history in opposition to the interpretations that only acknowledge the 
practical aspect (an extreme position apropos is that of W.J. Booth, Interpreting the 
World: Kant’s philosophy of history and religion, Toronto-Buffalo-London, University 
of Toronto Press, 1986, which traces Kant’s philosophy of history back to “the 
‘modest language’ of rational faith”, p. 110). 
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Erste Einleitung of the third Critique) it is conceived in a weak sense, as a 
logic-systematic finality: every conceptual totality, as ideas are, constitutes a 
formally teleological system, insofar as the position of each component is 
defined according to its relation with each of the other parts and with the 
whole. This totalizing function is notoriously carried out by the dialectical 
reason with a merely regulative value, while the material that is systematically 
organized this way is the object of constitutive knowledge. Yet the way in 
which constitutive knowledge (itself devoid of systematic relationships, which 
go beyond the synthesis of experience) joins the rational idea of the totality 
remains problematic. The junction should be represented by rational 
principles of “homogeneity”, “specification” and “continuity” of nature. Yet 
these principles, which are themselves purely logic, on one hand can be 
applied to reality only through as many transcendental principles of reason 
that prefigure the objective structure of nature. On the other hand, however, 
they are unable to determine any natural object: not being of intellectual 
nature, they count only as “heuristic principles”16. In 1788 Kant would admit 
that he had not been clear regarding what authorizes the shift to teleological 
(regulative) principles, where the causal (constitutive)17 laws appear 
insufficient. These conceptual tensions disappear only in the Critique of 
Judgment: a stronger conception of finality emerges here, which now receives 
the dignity of a “transcendental principle” or, more specifically, of the 
“eautonomous” principle of the power of judgment18. In the ‘Critique of 
Teleological Judgment’ finality does not only have a logical-systematic 
character, but rather it assumes a specific organic one: it becomes—within 
the limits of reflective judgment—an objective finality, intrinsic to natural 
reality, both in the case that relates in the proper sense to a single organism 
(“organized natural product”), and in the case that applies analogically to 
nature as a whole, as “a system following the rule of ends”19. Though causal 
(determinant) explanations and finalistic (reflective) interpretations are never 
                                                 
16 A 663 = B 691; Critique of Pure Reason, p. 546. 
17 Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie, VIII, 160, 20-22. 
18 Cf. J. Peter, Das transzendentale Prinzip der Urteilkraft. Eine Untersuchung zur 
Funktion und Struktur der Reflektierenden Urteilskraft bei Kant, Berlin-New York, de 
Gruyter, 1992, pp. 62-65. 
19 V, 376, 12 and V, 379, 2; Critique of Judgement, translated by J. Creed Meredith, 
Oxford, Clarendon Press, II, pp. 24 and  28. 
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interchangeable, they are no longer found on two parallel planes, but rather 
are two aspects of the same reality. In this way, the caesura between efficient 
causality and final causality is eliminated. Even if the unity between 
mechanism and finalism comes down to the “supersensible substrate of 
nature”20, mechanical causality works as a function of the overall natural 
finality and, vice versa, finalistic interpretation never obstructs the path to 
mechanical explanation, in such a way that the two perspectives (and the two 
forms of knowledge) integrate. In the Dialectic of pure reason, and in Idea, the 
two cognitive dimensions of determinant (causal) synthesis and regulative 
(final) knowledge in some way remain juxtaposed. It is only in the Critique of 
Judgment (and in subsequent writings on the philosophy of history) that a true 
convergence of them is realized. 
     
2. Theoretical knowledge and moral judgment – The problem of convergence 
between causal (constitutive) knowledge and teleological (regulative) 
knowledge disappears in Kant’s works from the first half of the seventeen-
nineties that concern the Kantian concept of history, Über den Gemeinspruch, 
das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis (On the 
Common Saying; ‘This May be True in Theory, but it does not Apply in 
Practice, 1793) and Zum ewigen Frieden (Perpetual Peace, 1795). In both 
works the discussion of the historical action of nature is resumed, now 
identified as Providence itself21. Nature and Providence lead history toward its 
overall finality, using a mechanism that is entirely ascribable to the causal 
action of empirical phenomena: other than antagonism, which is already 
invoked in Idea (the “unsocial sociability”), war, linguistic and religious 
diversity, as well as commercial spirit and power of money are all considered 
instruments of progress. Yet, according to the theoretical results of the 
Critique of Judgment, this deterministic point of view, which in individual 
causal connections requires a determinant knowledge, joins itself with ease to 
a teleological concept of historical totality, that is aware of its cognitive limits 
and of its exclusively regulative character. To have faith in the positive 
function of war for the sake of progress “is no more than a personal opinion 
                                                 
20 V, 422, 12-13; Critique of Judgement, II, p. 82. 
21 VIII, 310, 23; VIII, 361, 4; Political Writings, p. 90; p. 108. 
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and hypothesis; it is uncertain, like all judgments which profess to define the 
appropriate natural cause of an intended effect which is not wholly within our 
control”22. This observation counts for all forms of historical “mechanism”. In 
On Common Saying the principle that human progress “may at times be 
interrupted, but never broken off ” is not theoretically provable, but is 
acceptable to “assume” as a practical foundation of action until proven 
otherwise23. Perpetual Peace confirms that, being unable to embrace the 
whole series of determinant causes, human knowledge cannot “observe” 
(erkennen) the Providence in nature, nor can it “infer (schliessen) its 
existence” from it24. Yet this perspective, which is “far-fetched” if considered in 
its theoretical form, where human reason “must keep within the bounds of 
possible experience”, acquires a practical reality as a criterion for bending 
human sensibility to morals, understood here as the “concept (Pflichtbegriff) of 
perpetual peace”25.  
In Kant’s works from ’93 and ’95, another cognitive level emerges 
alongside theoretical knowledge (composed of regulative and constitutive 
knowledge entirely reconciled): that of moral judgment. Being practical, this 
knowledge addresses in primis not the description of history, but rather the 
action of man in history.   
 
I base my argument upon my inborn duty of influencing posterity in such a way 
that it will make constant progress (and I must thus assume that progress is possible) 
and that this duty may be rightfully handed down from one member of the series to 
the next26.  
 
The problem of the philosophy of history continually exceeds the theoretical 
realm, extending itself into the practical realm in both an anthropological-
pragmatic sense and an expressly moral one. The question here can be left 
open if historical progress has also a moral character (as On the Common 
Saying seems to suggest) or only a legal one, thereby favoring the merely 
exterior conditions – right and culture – for individual moral action (as 
suggested in the majority of Kantian texts). In any case, the realization of 
                                                 
22 VIII, 311, 35 - 312,1; Political Writings, p. 91. 
23 VIII, 309, 1-2; Political Writings, p. 88. 
24 VIII, 362, 2; Political Writings, pp. 108-109. 
25 VIII, 362, 8-9; 14-15; Political Writings, p. 109. 
26 VIII, 309, 4-10; Political Writings, pp. 88-89. 
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right, that in the form of the republican constitution and of the federation for 
peace is a fundamental historical telos, falls under the imperatives of the pure 
practical reason. Though he never explicitly theorizes this assumption, Kant 
thinks of a double employment for the same pure practical reason: a 
specifically ethical employment and a juridical employment27. In Perpetual 
Peace the “doctrine of right” is considered an expression of morality28. 
Anyway, the moral finality (or the juridical-moral finality) of history does not 
refer to a plain requirement, but rather to the specific form of rational 
knowledge expressed by the categorical imperative. To say that perpetual 
peace is a duty29, or that universally legislative reason places its absolute veto 
for war (“Es soll kein Krieg sein”30), or that man must overcome the state of 
nature and establish a condition of right31, is the result of real knowledge. 
Moreover, this knowledge is constitutive as it is based on a a priori synthesis, 
despite being immediately expressed by the “fact” of reason and not 
articulated in transcendental forms.   
As a command of the universally legislative reason, the imperative of 
reason counts a priori and is independent of any empirical condition. As 
previously stated, it is a practical knowledge that commands an action, not a 
theoretical knowledge that describes a situation. Nevertheless, morality 
cannot not have an “interest” in history and in the world. The imperative would 
lose its meaning without a teleological perspective that shows at least the 
                                                 
27 At least this is the most accredited interpretation. Cf. W. Kersting, Wohlgeordnete 
Freiheit. Immanuel Kants Rechts- und Staatsphilosophie, Frankfurt am Main, 
Suhrkamp, 1993, pp. 112-133. The theory of the one and only pure practical root of 
right and ethics is, nevertheless, challenged by supporters of the 
Unabhängigkeitstheorie: cf. J. Ebbinghaus, Kant und das 20. Jahrhundert, in 
Gesammelte Aufsätze, Vorträge und Reden, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche 
Buchgesellschaft, 1968, pp. 111-115 and Die Strafen für Tötung eines Menschen 
nach Prinzipien einer Rechtsphilosophie, Bonn, Bouvier, 1968, pp. 20-22; G. 
Geismann, Ethik und Herrschaftsordnung, Tübingen, Mohr, 1974, pp. 56-61 and 
World Peace: rational Idea and Reality. On the Principles of Kant’s Political 
Philosophy, in H. Oberer (ed.), Kant. Analysen – Probleme – Kritik, Würzburg, 
Königshausen & Neumann, 1996, pp. 266-274. 
28 VIII, 383, 21; 384, 32; Political Writings, p. !26, 129. 
29 Zum ewigen Frieden, VIII, 362, 9; Political Writings, p. 109.  Cf. also Die 
Metaphysik der Sitten, VI, 355, 2; The Metaphysics of Morals, ed, by M. Gregor, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 123. 
30 Die Metaphysik der Sitten, VI, 354, 21; The Metaphysics of Morals, p. 123: „there 
is to be no war“. 
31 VIII, 289, 23-28; VIII, 348, 3 – 349, 6; Political Writings, pp. 73, 102. 
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possibility of its realization. The concept of history presented by Mendelssohn, 
according to which there is no progress of mankind in history, but rather a 
continuous, stationary oscillation between advancement and regression, 
would thwart any moral undertaking of man and would amount to a substantial 
impossibility of ethics. For similar purposes in the Critique of Practical 
Reason, after defining the categorical imperative in its absoluteness in the 
Analytic, Kant maintains in the Dialectic that if the highest good, which joins 
happiness with morality, “is impossible in accordance with practical rules, then 
the moral law, which commands us to promote it, must be fantastic and 
directed to empty imaginary ends and must therefore in itself be false”32. In 
his reflection on history Kant continually argues that the command of morality 
does not disagree with the philosophical-theoretical knowledge of history. As 
stated already in Idea, without foreseeing a final era where man’s ends are 
completely developed, “all practical principles” would be destroyed33. The 
fundamental question in Perpetual Peace is: “what does nature do in relation 
to the end [of perpetual peace] which man’s own reason prescribes to him as 
a duty, i.e. how does nature help to promote his moral purpose (moralische 
Absicht)?”34. If the “guarantee” of perpetual peace, which in the first 
Supplement is completely entrusted to the nature-providence mechanism, “is 
not sufficient to enable us to prophesy the future theoretically, it is enough for 
practical purposes. It makes it our duty to work out our way towards this goal, 
which is more than an empty chimera”35.  
In On the Common Saying and in Perpetual Peace the problem of the 
relationship between different historical knowledge no longer concerns the 
relation between constitutive and regulative knowledge, which were 
reconciled in the Critique of Judgment. Rather, it concerns the relation 
between theoretical knowledge and moral judgment.  
On one hand, the fact that in these two works the philosophy of history 
elaborates a causal-teleological perspective in which the mechanism of nature 
itself favors the realization of right cannot but sanction the harmonic 
                                                 
32 V, 114, 6-9; Critique of Practical Reason, ed. M. Gregor, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, p. 95. 
33 VIII, 19, 13; Political Writings, p. 43. 
34 VIII, 365, 21-23; Political Writings, p. 112. 
35 VIII, 368, 17-20; Political Writings, p. 114. 
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convergence between theoretical knowledge (in the two forms of determinant 
and reflective judgment) and moral judgment. In fact, the teleological 
perspective would not be fully explained, if confined to the realm of theoretical 
interpretation: its full meaning depends entirely on its projection toward the 
ethical realm. Natura daedala rerum proves the real possibility of right, 
favoring the “moral purpose” of men, who would be discouraged from 
engaging in this obligation, despite being imposed by reason, if this were in 
fact impossible (ultra posse nemo obligatur). 
On the other hand, the problem of integration of the different kinds of 
historical-philosophical knowledge persists in a different form. The stress of 
the causal objective moment, that is already present in Idea and resumed in 
the works from ’93 and ’95 (though more clearly subordinate to a teleological 
conception), has as its consequence the acknowledgment of the non-
intentional character of human behavior (or at least the majority of it) with 
regard to the final destination. Historical progress appears as a process in 
which individual forces and goals become instruments of a collective, 
unintentional purpose. These instruments are based on an ‘eterogenesis of 
ends’ that goes through history, at times clearly opposing itself to human 
intentions: man wants “concord”, nature wants “discord”. Kant’s adherence to 
the culture of the Enlightenment, in this case predominantly Anglo-Saxon, 
persists here too. 
 
Individual men and even entire nations little imagine that, while they are 
pursuing their own ends, each in his own way and often in opposition to others, they 
are unwillingly guided in their advance along a course intended by nature. They are 
unconsciously promoting an end which, even if they knew what it was, would 
scarcely arouse their interest36. 
 
  We must look to nature alone, or rather to providence (since it requires the 
highest wisdom to fulfill this purpose), for a successful outcome which will first affect 
the whole and then the individual  parts. The schemes of men, on the other hand, 
begin with the parts, and frequently get no further than them. For the whole is too 
great for men to encompass; while they can reach it with their ideas, they cannot 
actively influence it, especially since their schemes conflict with one another to such 
an extent that they could hardly reach agreement of their own free volition37. 
 
For if I say that nature wills that this or that should happen, this does not 
mean that nature imposes on us a duty to do it, for duties can only be imposed by 
                                                 
36 Idee, VIII, 17, 21-26; Idea, in Political Writings, p. 41. 
37 Gemeinspruch, VIII, 310, 21-29; On Common Saying, in Political Writings, p. 90. 
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practical reason, acting without any external constraint. On the contrary, nature does 
it herself, whether we are willing or not (fata volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt)38.   
  
 Amid theoretical knowledge and moral judgment there is an ineluctable 
tension, despite the fact that the final result of the historical mechanism 
collimates exteriorly with moral (or moral-juridical) order. Ethical command 
cannot leave freedom and good intention (Gesinnung) of the individual out of 
consideration. On the contrary, the mechanism of nature takes its course 
entirely independently from individual freedom, even though Kant points out 
that it does not exclude it39. Moral knowledge and causal-teleological 
knowledge proceed in harmony, but along parallel paths. If in Idea the line of 
juxtaposition runs along the boundary between causal knowledge and 
teleological knowledge, the difficulty of finding a point of intersection in the 
seventeen-nineties concerns the relationship between “theoretical” knowledge 
in its entirety (which implies the harmonic synergy of causality and finality) 
and ethical-normative knowledge. In Perpetual Peace the two requirements 
are treated separately, even in the material organization of the work. The 
exposition of the articles for peace (preliminary and definitive) includes the 
ethical-normative dimension; the first Supplement, instead, regarding the 
“guarantee of a perpetual peace”, refers to both the teleological and causal 
perspective of the mechanism of nature. Even more clearly, in the conclusion 
of On the Common Saying, after expressing his hope in the efficacy of the 
juridical (or ethical-juridical) principle that commands the “earthly gods” to 
work in order to make possible the peace and federation of the people, Kant 
adds: “I likewise rely (in subsidium) upon the very nature of things to force 
men to do what they do not willingly choose (fata volentem ducunt, nolentem 
trahunt)”40. In such a philosophy of history Kant does his best to converge, not 
without difficulty, the requirements of his ethical-juridical thought (to which the 
status of critical-transcendental thought cannot be refused, despite the many 
                                                 
38 Zum ewigen Frieden, VIII, 365, 28-32; Perpetual Peace, in Political Writings, p. 
112. 
39 Cf. Idee, VIII, 17, 7-8; Political Writings, p. 41: history tries to identify a “regular 
progression” even in “the free exercise of the human will of human will on a large 
scale”; in Zum ewigen Frieden, VIII, 365, 23-26 (Political Writings, p.112), we find the 
problem of how nature compels man to do what he ought to do but does not do, 
“without prejudice to the free agency of man”. 
40 VIII, 313, 12-14, my italics; Political Writings, p. 92. 
 15 
reservations put forward by various interpreters) and the ideology of 
Enlightenment, in which the idea of progress is founded on the (dogmatic) 
identity of reason and nature41.      
 
3. A point of intersection – These elements of dissonance, or at least of non-
resolved juxtaposition, are assuaged in the final work that Kant dedicates to 
the philosophy of history, Erneuerte Frage: Ob das menschliche Geschlecht 
im beständigen Fortschreiten zum Besseren sei (An Old Question Raised 
Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?), which occupies the 
second part of The Conflict of the Faculties, 1798. It must be noted, above all, 
that in this work both ‘theoretical’ components of historical knowledge endure. 
It is true that the weight of constitutive knowledge appears to have reduced 
considerably. In fact, this has caused interpreters (some of them recent) to set 
the Conflict against Idea42. Certainly, the hope for knowledge of the overall 
process of history that is modeled after the motion of the stars and planets 
(knowledge still yearned for in ’84) can be ruled out entirely. To predict the 
whole historical development means to assume the vantage point of 
Providence, just as in order to correctly understand the movement of the stars 
one must assume the vantage point of the sun. Yet if the latter is accessible to 
man with the help of reason, the former is not within his power, as he cannot 
apply the “coherency according to natural laws” to the free actions of historical 
agents. Nevertheless, if it cannot be extended to the determination of the 
entire course of history, constitutive knowledge does not lose its utility when 
applied to limited sectors, already available as empirical data. This is clearly 
suggested by the fact that in The Conflict of the Faculties there is a double 
                                                 
41 For more on these difficulties cf. M. Mori,  Aufklärung und Kritizismus in Kants 
Geschichtsphilosophie, in S. Carboncini (ed.) Die deutsche Aufklärung im Spiegel 
der neueren italienischen Forschung, Hamburg, Meiner, 1991, (“Aufklärung”, V, 
1991), pp. 81-102. Refer also to the essay by R. Brandt, Quem fata non ducunt, 
trahunt. Der Staat, die Staaten und der friedliche Handel, in K.-M. Kodalle (ed.), Der 
Vernunftfrieden. Kants Entwurf im Widerstreit, Würzburg, Königshausen & Neumann, 
1996, pp. 71-86, in which, without going so far as to refer to an inconsistency 
between critical thought and Enlightenment tradition, Kant’s adherence to a 
philosophy of history is highlighted, where morality and utility (honestum and utile), 
reason and nature, converge according to an already classical scheme, but 
refreshed by the (above all Scottish) Enlightenment. 
42 Cf. L. Krasnoff, The Fact of Politics. History and Teleology in Kant, “European 
Journal of Philosophy”, II, 1994, pp. 22-40. 
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reference to the concept of experience—negative in one case, and positive in 
the other. On one hand, Kant argues that the problem of progress cannot be 
resolved “immediately” through experience, since this can neither confirm nor 
refute any of the three alternative possibilities that can describe history as a 
whole (progress, regress and standstill). Yet in the subsequent paragraph he 
maintains that “the prophetic history of the human race must be connected to 
some experience”43, which will be the central argument in the work. In fact, in 
order to found our predictions about the progress of mankind, “we have only 
empirical data (experiences)”; that is, we must refer to “the physical cause of 
our actions as these actually occur as phaenomena”44. In his argumentation, 
Kant notoriously favors one experience in particular—the enthusiasm 
produced by the French Revolution on its disinterested spectators. Yet in 
Kantian gnosiology single experiences do not exist. Each experience is both 
the cause and effect of other experiences, tightly interwoven in one or more 
causal series. Only as a totality (this time conditioned, insofar as expressed 
by an intellectual category) can they effectively constitute true experience. 
Concentrating the whole argumentation of the essay on experience, even if on 
one experience, necessarily implies a return of constitutive knowledge, albeit 
functional to a more ample framework of regulative nature. Only through 
experience can we reach a solution to the problem of historical progress, 
though certainly not “immediately”, as an object given in sensible intuition, but 
“mediately”, as a survey of causal and constitutive connections that, being 
projected beyond the boundaries of possible experience, can be indicative of 
an overall direction.    
 And so we reach the heart of the work, that is, an argumentation in 
favor of progress which is quite different from the “guarantee” exhibited in 
Perpetual Peace. Beyond its explicit finality this argument reveals a new 
modality in the reciprocal relations between the three forms of historical 
knowledge previously mentioned. In fact, none of these, considered by itself, 
can provide a guarantee of progress: constitutive knowledge is certain, but it 
does not go beyond possible experience; regulative knowledge, on the 
contrary, encompasses the whole, but does not have a determinant value; 
                                                 
43 VII, 84, 11-12; The Conflict of the Faculties, Abaris Books, New York, 1979, p.151. 
44 VII, 91, 29-31; Conflict, p. 165. 
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ethical knowledge expresses an exclusively normative, though absolute, 
dimension. The course of history can, instead, be reached through the 
synergy of the three forms of knowledge, which now find their actual point of 
cohesion.  
 The text that best exhibits the verification of this interpretative 
hypothesis is the brief § 5, completed by the subsequent §§ 6 e 7. Though 
very familiar, the entire paragraph must be cited as it is simple only in 
appearance. 
There must be some experience in the human race which, as an event 
(Begebenheit), points to the disposition (Beschaffenheit) and capacity (Vermögen) of 
the human race to be the cause of its own advance toward the better, and (since this 
should be the act of a being endowed with freedom), toward the human race as 
being the author (Urheber) of this advance. But from a given cause an event as an 
effect can be predicted only if the circumstances prevail which contribute to it (welche 
dazu mitwirkend sind). That these conditions must come to pass some time or other 
can, of course, be predicted in general, as in the calculation of probability in games 
of chance; but that prediction cannot enable us to know whether was is predicted is 
to happen in my life and I am to have the experience of it. Therefore, an event must 
be sought which points to (hinweise) the existence of such a cause and to its 
effectiveness in the human race, undetermined with regard to time, and which would 
allow progress toward the better to be concluded as an inevitable consequence. This 
conclusion then could also be extended to the history of the past (that it has always 
been in progress) in such a way that that event would be considered not itself as the 
cause of history, but only as an intimation, a historical sign (signum rememorativum, 
demonstrativum, prognostikon) demonstrating the tendency of the human race 
viewed in its entirety, that, is, seen not as a sum of individuals (for that would yield an 
interminable enumeration and computation), but rather as divided into nations and 
states (as it is encountered on earth)45. 
  
The first form of knowledge that falls within prophetic history is moral 
judgment. The cause that is discussed in the first sentence of the paragraph is 
a moral causality: this is not the mechanical causality of the phenomenal 
world, but, rather, the noumenal one of beings that act freely, insofar as 
“authors” (Urheber). Moral nature in this cause is confirmed more than once in 
the subsequent paragraphs. Man’s tendency toward the better, as specified 
from the very title of § 6, is a “moral tendency”. In fact, the occurrence that 
relates to this—that is, the enthusiastic participation shown by the spectators 
of the French Revolution—refers, on one hand, to human race as a whole, 
                                                 
45 VII, 84, 13-35; Conflict, p. 151 
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insofar as it is universal, and on the other hand reveals a “moral character 
(moralischen Charakter)” and a “moral predisposition (moralische Anlage)”46, 
insofar as it is disinterested. Kant is most likely referring to morality as 
doctrine of law, as he did in Perpetual Peace, and not specifically to ethics. In 
fact, he argues that this “moral cause” has two aspects, which concern on one 
hand a “right” (in this case, the right of all peoples to have their preferred 
constitution) and on the other hand an “end” which is also a “duty” (but of legal 
nature), that is, the realization of the republican constitution, the only one that 
is  “just and morally good in itself”47. The same goes for the remark for which 
“genuine enthusiasm always moves only toward what is ideal and, indeed, to 
what is purely moral, such as the concept of right, and it cannot be grafted 
onto self-interest”48. But, as previously observed, the presupposition is that 
the pure doctrine of right arises from the juridical employment of pure practical 
reason, which has a transcendental value similar to its specifically ethical 
employment.   
Secondly, the paragraph contains a reference to a regulative 
knowledge. The “disposition” (Beschaffenheit) and the “capacity” (Vermögen) 
of humanity that allow it to be “the cause of its own advance” suggest a final 
causality that moves toward a teleological goal, though not specifically 
defined: that is to say, the complete realization of “those natural capacities 
which are directed towards the use of his [man’s] reason” discussed in Idea, 
or the institution of the internally and externally perfect constitution, according 
to Perpetual Peace and the Conflict of the Faculties as well. This causality is 
entirely free from the conditions of determinant judgment, since on one hand 
its subject is not an empirical phenomenon, but rather a moral determination, 
and on the other hand it does not concern a succession of phenomenal 
causes and effects, but rather the definition of a moral idea; that is, the 
perfection of mankind (albeit only juridical). As a result, this teleological-moral 
causality operates “undetermined with regard to time”. It cannot be linked to 
any of the temporal modalities—that is to say, the transcendental schemes 
                                                 
46 VII, 85, 15 and 28; Conflict, p. 153. 
47 VII, 85, 34; Conflict, p. 153. 
48 VII, 86, 9-10. For more on the relationship between morality and enthusiasm cf. 
Gemeinspruch, VIII, 287, 30-34; On Common Saying, in Political Writings, p. 71. 
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that rule the categories of modality49: not to any given time (it is not only 
“possible”); not to a specific time (it is not generally translated in a “real” 
occurrence); and not even to every time (the connection between the cause 
and the effect that it involves does not have the “necessity” of determinant 
causality, but is only “inevitable” within the teleological structure of reflective 
judgment). 
 Thirdly, § 5 cannot prescind from an implicit reference to determinant 
knowledge. So far, moral causality has been considered a cause of the 
advance toward the better that can be represented only in regulative form: this 
causality does not fall within the determination of empirical phenomena. In 
order for it to be translated into facts of experience, it needs the cooperation 
of empirical and sensible causes. In such a way this moral causality can have 
a phenomenal effect, which is recognizable in the realm of determinant 
judgment like a link on a necessary causal chain50. According to the 
interpretation that is being proposed, the “circumstances […] which contribute 
to it” (die Umstände […], welche dazu mitwirkend sind), whose realization is 
indispensible in order to translate the moral cause into an “event”, are 
necessarily empirical contributory-causes—there is always just one moral 
causality of the noumenal subject. What happened, in Kant’s eyes, is that 
certain facts of experience (the events of the French Revolution, or perhaps 
even the process of republicanization that followed the Revolution), such as 
empirical contributory causes along with moral causality, caused the universal 
and disinterested enthusiasm that can be considered—insofar as an “event”—
a historical sign of the disposition of mankind toward the better. In other 
words, the factors of “assistance” came to existence (or the “hindrances” did 
not) that are the condition of the causal effect of morality in the phenomenal 
sphere51. Moreover, popular participation, insofar as a fact of experience, is 
not only the effect of a causal empirical series that precedes and conditions it, 
but in turn also the cause of the series of effects that derive from it. 
Enthusiasm, though it concerns the spectators only and not the actors of the 
                                                 
49 Cf. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 144-145 / B 184. 
50 Cf. Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, IV, 456, 3-6; Foundation of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, 2nd edition revised, traslated by L. W. Beck, Upper Saddle 
River (N.J.), Prentice-Hall, 1997, p. 70. 
51 Cf. Kritik der Urtheilskraft, V, 195, 33-34; Critique of Judgement, p. 37. 
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revolutionary events, is not a mere interior sentiment (which would anyway fall 
under a causal series as an internal phenomenon), but rather the cause of 
certain external behaviors: in fact, Kant observes that the manifestation of this 
revolutionary favor “is fraught with danger”52. Similarly, the affirmation that this 
event “is not to be forgotten”53, regardless of the outcome of the Revolution, 
cannot only concern the revelation —or, better yet, the circumstantial 
evidence —of the moral tendency of humanity. It inevitably refers also to the 
fact that this event will continue to serve as a model for “new efforts of this 
kind”; that is to say, for actions in the phenomenal realm of history. From now 
on it is the cause of an indefinite series of events. Kant believes most likely 
that the “event” might influence an illuminated despot, in such a way that the 
process toward the realization of the republican constitution might occur 
without the need for other revolutions 54 .   
Yet there may be need to clarify a point concerning the relation 
between the empirical “event” of the emotive participation in the Revolution 
(and the inevitable phenomenal causal network in which it is involved) and the 
moral cause of the progress of mankind. Projected onto history in general, 
past and future, the “event” is not a “cause” of progress, but simply its 
“historical sign”: it cannot have but a circumstantial value, because there is, in 
general, obviously no connection in terms of cause and effect between a 
particular empirical fact and the general orientation of history, which implies 
the series of events prior to it as well55. But if the event is seen as concerning 
the particular historical moment of which Kant does have experience, what in 
fact occurs is a particular causal connection. Enthusiasm in this case is not 
only the sign, but rather the actual effect of moral cause, which entwined itself 
with other empirical contributory-causes at that particular junction. Obviously, 
this causal connection is not certain, since the effect of moral causality in the 
                                                 
52 VII, 85, 27; Conflict, p. 153. 
53 VII, 88, 12; Conflict, p. 159. 
54 Cf. VII, 87, 11-14 / 88, 1-7; Conflict, pp. 157-59. 
55 I think that R. Brandt’s theory, according to which there has been progress in 
history starting from the French Revolution, is not sustainable on the basis of textual 
evidence (R. Brandt - W. Stark (eds.), Zum Streit der Fakultäten, in Neue 
Autographen und Dokumente zu Kants Leben, Schriften und Vorlesungen, Hamburg, 
Meiner, 1987, p. 39). 
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sensible world, though certain, remains inexplicable in its modalities56. But the 
event’s aptitude to refer (hinweisen) to moral disposition directs us to presume 
that the event be the effect of morality. Indeed, if a moral consequence were 
not to be displayed in it, that event would be devoid of meaning to the aim of 
the advancement of mankind towards the better. In this way the occurrence of 
enthusiasm is on the point of convergence between the series of phenomenal 
causes and the moral causality, where the latter crosses the former without 
interrupting it. In § 5 Kant refers to three types of causalities: 1) a noumenal 
causality through which moral disposition produces the event of enthusiasm; 
2) a final causality through which this very disposition is the cause of the 
advancement of mankind toward the better; 3) an efficient and phenomenal 
causality whereby the “event” is, on one hand, the effect of revolutionary 
events (the phenomenal contributory-causes) and, on the other hand, the 
cause of additional philo-revolutionary behaviors. Three types of knowledge 
respectively correspond to these three causes: 1) moral judgment, that 
expresses the categorical imperative; 2) regulative knowledge, especially in 
the form of reflective judgment; 3) constitutive knowledge, in the form of 
transcendental synthesis of experience and of determinant judgment.   
 The guarantee of progress results from the synergy of all three forms of 
knowledge. Moral judgment assures us that man is able to “act” morally, 
which means on the one hand to have good will, and on the other to turn this 
will into a moral phenomenal effect57. Only reflective judgment (regulative 
knowledge) can project this ability from the individual to mankind, turning an 
individual moral certainty into a practical (regulative) idea of history as 
progress. In the end, only determinant knowledge can verify the actual 
realization of the ethical-teleological perspective in the reality of history, 
though limited to fragments of causal series. Yet this confirmation of 
normative and regulative knowledge by constitutive knowledge, that is, this 
confirmation of the idea by experience (though fragmentary), constitutes the 
                                                 
56 Cf. Religion, VI, 170, 30-38; Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. And 
Other Writings, edited by A. Wood and G. di Giovanni, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1998, p. 166. 
57 Cf. for example  Kritik der Urtheilskraft, V, 195, 22-24, where the possibility for an 
action of the supersensible over the sensible is already found “in the concept of a 
causality by freedom, the operation of which, in conformity with the formal laws of 
freedom itself, is to take effect in the world” (Critique of Judgement, p. 37). 
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real foundation of the evidence. This evidence, in a way, has circumstantial 
value (as an “historical sign”) for the future, whereby experience cannot yet 
provide the knowledge of those physical contributory-causes that allow for the 
moral cause to turn into historical reality. On the other hand it has definitive 
value regarding the present, because the moral disposition shown by the 
occurrence of enthusiasm “not only permits people to hope for progress 
toward the better, but is already itself progress in so far as its capacity is 
sufficient for the present”58. 
 
4. History and Experience – The reference to experience as confirmation of 
progress is not an irrelevant aspect of Kantian philosophy of history. Already 
in Idea Kant had made reference to this function, pointing out that only “a 
little” (etwas Weniges) of the purposeful natural process is revealed in 
experience59. In On the Common Saying  he claims there is “various 
evidence” (manche Beweise) that mankind in its entirety is advanced when 
compared to the past60. Similarly Das Ende aller Dinge (The End of All 
Things) states that there are “experimental proofs (Erfahrungsbeweise) of the 
superior morals of our age as compared with all previous ones”61. In each of 
these cases, though, Kant fails to clarify what “experience” or “evidence” or 
“proof” consists of—the term Beweis is most likely used in a very weak and 
generic sense. Only in The Conflict of the Faculties the “experience” that 
confirms the progressive character of history becomes a specific fact.   
Yet there remains another more important difference between the work 
from 1798 and the previous ones. Up until ’98 experience served to ascertain 
the empirical causal connections (regularities of social phenomena, effects of 
antagonism, consequences of war, etc) that provided the structure for the 
nature-providence mechanism and, therefore, for history. At times, as in Idea, 
experience is put into relation with the possibility of starting from a partial 
constitutive knowledge and arriving at the determination of the entire system, 
even if with the same uncertainty with which certain astronomical 
                                                 
58 VII, 85, 17-18; Conflict, p. 153. 
59 VIII, 27, 11-12; Political Writings, p. 50. 
60 VIII, 310, 4-6; Political Writings, p. 89. 
61 VIII, 332, 18-20; The end of all things, in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere 
Reason. And Other Writings, p. 199. 
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observations allow us to determine “the path which our sun with its whole 
swarm of satellites is following within the vast system of the fixed stars”62. In 
other instances, as in On the Common Saying (or The End of All Things, or 
Perpetual Peace), empirical evidence has to do with the guarantee of the 
moral progress of mankind. Yet in both cases progress depends on the 
existence of a “mechanism” of nature, conceived of both cognitively and 
morally, which enables us to arrange the multiplicity of occurrences into a 
systematic whole. In The Conflict of the Faculties, on the other hand, the 
reference to the nature-providence mechanism—which is only mentioned 
once in § 10—is overlooked, and this interest in the systematic character of 
history is attenuated. Considered experience, that is to say, the disinterested 
participation in the French Revolution, does not aim at finding segments of 
causal series confirming the consistency of historical-natural order with moral 
one, but rather at recognizing an empirical effect of the moral causality which 
founds progress. Through the effects unfurled in reality empirical knowledge 
demonstrates the existence of a moral causality of mankind and its realization 
in the historical world on certain conditions.    
This is not to say that the element of mechanical causality disappears 
in the Conflict of the Faculties. When asking himself what comprises the 
advance toward the better, Kant responds: “Not an ever-growing quantity of 
morality with regard to intention, but an increase of the products of legality in 
dutiful actions whatever their motives”63. Despite the fact that Kant’s position 
regarding this point appears to oscillate, the solution in the Conflict is clear. 
Humanity cannot become morally better, since it cannot enhance its own 
potential for morality. Instead the phenomenal effects of its moral causality, 
that is the legal behaviors, continue to increase; through the causal 
mechanism, they enter a virtuous circle in which each of them causes a series 
of phenomena of increasing legality. Just as the unforgettable enthusiasm for 
the Revolution will not lack positive empirical effects by influencing future 
behaviors, each externally moral action will be an empirical (and mechanical) 
cause of a growing number of legal behaviors. We will continue to behave 
better not for moral reasons, but “partly out of love of honor, partly out of well-
                                                 
62 VIII, 27, 17-19; Political Writings, p. 50. 
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understood self-interest”64.  This amelioration will be the consequence of the 
moralischer Zwang,  which by no means requires “that all men be virtuous: it 
is only necessary that the mere habit of showing public respect for morality be 
realized”65. The exterior conduct of man will continue to be better, “when one 
will no longer achieve honors, social relations, offices or even a wife without 
rectitude and without the external signs of good intention”66. It is in no way 
possible to predict when the causal morality of humanity will intervene in 
history (as it occurred in the Revolution), since this falls outside of temporal 
determinations. But when it does occur—that is, when the “circumstances” 
that are empirical contributory-causes will be present—a new causal series of 
legal phenomena will enter history multiplying their effects. Each irruption of 
morality in history has as its effect an increment of phenomenal legality, 
though the reverse certainly does not hold true: the largest diffusion of legality 
will perhaps favor moral behaviors but will not be their cause, since ethical 
choice can come about only out of the abysses of noumenal autonomy.     
It has been thought that Kant’s later lost of interest for the systematic 
aspect of history entails the risk of a regression in dogmatism, because only a 
completely teleological-systematic perspective corresponds to the 
requirements of critical philosophy67. Yet for me the opposite seems to hold 
true. The regulative nature of ideas of pure reason or of reflective judgment 
allows for a systematic representation of history (with a few problems in the 
Critique of Pure Reason, with greater theoretical consistency in the Critique of 
Judgment), but it denies this concept any cognitive value. Therefore, to the 
extent that Kant wants to use it as a “guarantee” of progress (and not as a 
simple indication of non-impossibility), as his Enlightenment culture and many 
of his works would suggest, the risk of a dogmatic utilization of it necessarily 
emerges. This way the Kantian theory of Nature-Providence continues to 
remain suspended between a regulative perspective that does not guarantee 
and a guarantee that cannot have a critical foundation. Vice versa in The 
Conflict of the Faculties—by analogy with the normativity of many pages in 
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The Doctrine of Right—historical progress is entrusted above all to the 
assumption, perfectly consonant with the criticism, that moral causality acts in 
history. This causality will certainly unfold in the world, giving a general sense 
to the course of history: yet how and when cannot be predicted. The 
systematic design is not excluded but, rather than being a presupposition that 
gives a sense to history, it is the consequence of the fact that history, where 
moral causality works, has a sense.    
According to the work from ’98 experience tells us that this sense is not 
an illusion. In other words, the guarantee of historical progress is no longer 
sought outside of the world, in a teleological dimension of nature’s design that 
either is dogmatic or guarantees nothing at all. Only in the actual world, where 
history is realized, the guarantee of progress, that the practical reason 
commands and the teleological reason prefigures, can be found, though in 
fragments of experience. Even if, empirical knowledge in turn, always limited 
to a small portion of reality, cannot seize the overall direction of historical 
progress without the aid of moral judgment, which dictates how history should 
be, and of teleological judgment, which shows how history might be. To 
paraphrase Kant himself, if we consider their function in the philosophy of 
history separately, moral knowledge and teleological knowledge are empty, 
and empirical knowledge is blind.    
 
 
 
 
   
 
